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1 Introduction
The sharp rise in wages in the euro periphery before the Great Recession, followed by the
prolonged slump and slowly declining wages in the aftermath of the Great Recession, have
reinvigorated concerns about the harmfulness of downward nominal wage rigidity for macroe-
conomic adjustment (Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015). These concerns have received theoretical
support by a new class of currency-peg open economy models in which downward nominal
wage rigidity is put at center stage. Most influentially, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) show
that aggregate demand booms entail excessive wage inflation as economic agents fail to inter-
nalize the social cost of their own contribution to wage growth, exacerbating unemployment
in subsequent recessions.1
However, the stark rise in wages in the euro periphery stands in contrast to low rates of
wage inflation (i.e., wage moderation) in the euro core in the pre-crisis period, notably in
Germany. Moreover, intra-euro imbalances are frequently blamed on the interaction of these
two effects: as labor costs in the two groups of countries have diverged, so have their real
exchange rates and hence their “competitiveness”.2 On the theory side, Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2016) cannot explain wage moderation as they assume perfect labor market compe-
tition. Clearly, once wage setting is static, the unemployment effects of downward nominal
wage rigidity remain uninternalized by assumption. In contrast, as stressed by Elsby (2009),
once wage setters are forward-looking they internalize downward nominal wage rigidity in
future periods. As they act to restrain current wage inflation, the unemployment effects of
the rigidity in future periods may then remain small.
This paper studies wage inflation across euro area countries through the lens of a Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2016)-type model in which wage setters are assumed to be forward looking.
The main theoretical finding is that the model can generate excessive wage inflation, but
equally excessive wage moderation. Precisely, compared to social optimum, forward-looking
wage setters may restrain current wage inflation by too little, but equally too strongly, facing
wage-inflationary pressure. On the applied side, I use this insight to assess wage developments
across euro area countries before the euro zone crisis. Using country-level data on real ex-
change rates and tradable-sector TFP assembled in Berka et al. (2017), I find some evidence
for the above-cited wisdom: wages increased too strongly in the euro periphery, but by too
little in the euro core during the pre-crisis period.
1 Other recent papers building on the Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) framework include Na et al. (2018),
Kuvshinov et al. (2016), Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2017) and Bianchi et al. (2018).
2 See, for example, the recent discussion about Germany in The Economist (Economist, 2017). A recent article
highlighting the asymmetry in wage developments across euro area countries is Gilchrist et al. (2016). The
VoxEU book by Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015) discusses causes and consequences of the euro area crisis.
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To build intuition about the economic mechanism, in a first part of the paper I study
a textbook neoclassical labor market with downward nominal wage rigidity. Precisely, I
assume that wages can not be lower than a fraction of their level from the last period,
following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016). In this framework I derive the following condition
for efficiency:3 in periods when the wage rigidity is slack, the real wage must lie below the
household’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. In a labor market
diagram, this corresponds to a right-ward shift of labor supply, which keeps wage inflation in
check hence reduces the potential for unemployment in the following periods. I interpret this
as “wage restraint”. Wage restraint smooths working hours over the cycle, which raises the
average amount of output available for consumption.
Wage restraint arises because risk and nominal rigidities interact, as in Basu and Bundick
(2017). It depends on characteristics of the economy such as shock volatility, but also on
the economy’s current state. First, wage restraint is negatively related to (expected) price
inflation: as price inflation erodes the real wage, any rigidity on the nominal wage is effectively
dampened—a “greasing the wheels” effect (Tobin, 1972). Second, it varies with the elasticity
of labor demand. Intuitively, if whilst in a boom, the unemployment effect of the rigidity in
the next recession is expected to be large (a counter-cyclical elasticity of labor demand), the
extent of wage restraint in the boom must also become larger.
These insights carry over to a second part of the paper, in which I construct a model
of a two-sector (tradable and non-tradable) small open economy characterized by downward
nominal wage rigidity and a pegged nominal exchange rate. As the exchange rate peg rules
out the “greasing the wheels” effect, wage rigidity is particularly potent in this environment.4
Production occurs in both sectors, and the relative price between tradables and non-tradables
pins down the real exchange rate. Any nominal wage rise (the same across sectors as perfect
mobility of labor is assumed) entails a real appreciation by virtue of the Balassa-Samuelson
effect. Wage formation is forward looking, as households organize into labor unions.5 Upward
pressure on wages arises from two sources. First, I assume that technology shocks in the
tradable sector may drive wage inflation from the “supply” side. Second, preference shocks
may drive wage inflation from the “demand” side.
3 The efficient allocation is the one which maximizes household welfare, subject to downward nominal wage
rigidity being in place. Therefore, the efficient allocation is not first best, as this would be the allocation
without wage rigidity. Strictly speaking, I therefore characterize a “constrained-efficient” outcome, as in
Lorenzoni (2008) or Bianchi (2011, 2016).
4 Reducing price inflation (possibly to eliminate an “inflation bias”) is a classical argument for joining into a
nominal anchor, that is, for fixing the nominal exchange rate (Alesina and Barro, 2002).
5 The formalism follows the literature on centralized wage setting (e.g., Alesina and Perotti 1997 and Guzzo
and Velasco 1999), and in the limit as union size shrinks to zero, nests the case of monopolistic competition
in the labor market considered in Benigno and Ricci (2011).
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The model’s key insights are as follows. First, in line with Elsby (2009), the unions restrain
wage inflation in expansions in order to reduce unemployment in recessions. Second, in spite
of the aforesaid, the extent of wage restraint is not socially efficient.6
To see the intuition, consider a technology shock in the tradable sector. This shock drives
up wages, as well as shifts labor from the non-tradable into the tradable sector where the
technology innovation occurs. Because the labor demand elasticity is larger in this sector than
in the non-tradable sector, this shock temporarily raises the aggregate labor demand elasticity
hence makes this elasticity pro-cyclical.7 By the logic above, the extent of wage restraint in
the efficient allocation therefore declines. In contrast, because what matters for the demand
faced by the unions is their own (rather than the aggregate) labor demand elasticity, they
restrain wage inflation heavily following the shock, hence giving rise to a wage increase that is
excessively small. The opposite holds following demand shocks, as these draw labor into the
non-tradable sector thereby making the aggregate labor demand elasticity counter-cyclical.
Therefore following these shocks, in line with the results in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016),
wage inflation rates are excessively large.
In brief, the model predicts excessive wage inflation following demand shocks, but excessive
wage moderation following supply shocks. I use this insight to assess the differential in wage
developments across euro area countries before the euro zone crisis. To do so, I feed the
model with country-level data on tradable-sector TFP as well as intra-euro real exchange
rates from 1995-2007. The data is taken from Berka et al. (2017) and, as explained there, can
be interpreted not only in the time series, but also in the cross section. I am using the model
to back out the unobserved series for demand shocks during the sample period, which allows
me to construct a real exchange rate counter factual.
Results are the following. Wage restraint was too strong in the euro core in general. For
example, the Dutch real exchange rate was too weak throughout the entire sample period,
whereas the German and the Austrian real exchange rates depreciated too quickly until the
start of the crisis, albeit both starting from a too appreciated level. In contrast, the Spanish
real exchange appreciated too quickly in the years preceeding the euro zone crisis, even though
in the early years after 1995 the Spanish real exchange rate has been too weak. Overall, I
view my findings as a rough confirmation of the perceived-wisdom hypothesis (stated earlier
6 Two other sources of inefficiency are the following. First, the unions charge monopolistic wage mark-ups.
Second, the planner exploits (an equivalent of) the terms-of-trade externality, by which domestic working
hours can be reduced without a corresponding drop in consumption (Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001).
7 This follows directly from the Balassa-Samuelson effect. As nominal wages rise, the price of non-tradables
rises relative to the price of tradables. As a result, firms in the tradable sector face a larger increase in their
real wage (nominal wage divided by the sales price of their output) than firms in the non-tradable sector.
But this means that hours are reduced by more in the tradable sector, hence that labor demand in this
sector is relatively steeper.
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above), even though the picture in its details is more nuanced.
I also compute permanent consumption losses relative to the allocation where wage re-
straint is efficient. I find that consumption losses are disproportionate in Spain and Ireland,
amounting to more than 3% in about one tenth of the periods. The model makes this pre-
diction, even though the crisis has not materialized in sample (recall that the data ends in
2007). Finally, I also compute consumption losses relative to first best—the allocation without
downward wage rigidity to begin with. I show that the additional welfare loss is negligible.
Hence, I confirm the central prediction of Elsby (2009) in a dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium environment: welfare costs of downward wage rigidity per se, once internalized in the
appropriate way, cannot be expected to be substantial.
Related literature.—The paper contributes to the literature on the macroeconomic im-
plications of downward wage rigidity. In currency pegs, downward nominal wage rigidity is
particularly powerful, because the long-run price level is pinned down by the nominal anchor
country (Corsetti et al., 2013; Farhi and Werning, 2012).8 While the wage rigidity is hard-
wired in my analysis, other articles study ways to overcome it directly. For example, “fiscal
devaluations” consider internal devaluation via time-varying taxes (Farhi et al., 2014).
The paper adds to our understanding of the determinants of the euro area crisis. Gilchrist
et al. (2016) point to financial frictions as explaining the differential wage developments
across the euro core and periphery. Kuvshinov et al. (2016) explore how wage rigidity and
the zero lower bound may have paralyzed real exchange rate adjustment following a period of
deleveraging in the euro periphery. In my model, real exchange rate “misalignment” results
from inefficient wage restraint by wage setting agents.
On the theory side, my paper adds to the growing literature studying the interaction
between risk and nominal rigidities. As in Basu and Bundick (2017), wage restraint in my
analysis arises due to this interaction, and would be absent in a linearized version of my
model. Another contribution in this spirit is Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015).
A final strand of related literature links wage bargaining centralization and macroeconomic
efficiency. One part of the Calmfors and Driffill (1988) hypothesis is that larger labor unions
internalize the feedback of their action into the economy which may be welfare improving.
Evidence for a positive link between union-size and employment is contained in Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000); Daveri and Tabellini (2000). In my model I find that larger-sized unions
make wage restraint more efficient, yet that welfare may be reduced due to larger unions’
charging larger monopolistic mark-ups.
8 A resolution is temporary inflation in the nominal anchor country: Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2013) and
Fahr and Smets (2010) make this case for the euro zone, arguing that price inflation in the euro core may
help overcome downward nominal wage rigidity in the euro periphery.
4
2 Intuition
This section describes a textbook neoclassical labor market that is characterized by downward
nominal wage rigidity (henceforth DNWR). Specifically, as in Benigno and Ricci (2011),
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) and others, I assume that wages can not be lower than a
fraction of their level from the previous period. The goal of this analysis is to demonstrate
that, with this friction in place, efficient wage dynamics are characterized by what may be
called “wage restraint”—the fact that in boom periods, wages should increase by strictly less
than if they were completely downward-flexible.
An economy is populated by a representative household who derives utility from consump-
tion and dis-utility from work
U0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{ct − V (ht)} (2.1)
where V is positive, increasing and convex and where β < 1. A representative firm produces
consumption goods from labor yt = atF (ht), where F is positive, increasing and concave, and
where at is the firm’s level for productivity (exogenous and stochastic). The firm hires labor
according to a labor demand function:9
atF
′(ht) =
wt
pt
(2.2)
that is, by equating its marginal product to the real wage which it takes as given. The price
level pt is exogenous and stochastic. In contrast, the nominal wage wt is endogenous, can
adjust freely upwards, but is restricted in its ability to fall. Formally, I assume that
wt ≥ γwt−1; γ < 1, (2.3)
such that the nominal wage may fall by at most (1 − γ) percent per period. The model is
closed by assuming that the household consumes the output produced in each period (market
clearing condition)
ct = atF (ht), (2.4)
such that there is no savings technology. This assumption is without loss of generality, because
the household’s consumption utility is linear.
To understand the structure of this economy, consider any nominal wage path {wt} that
satisfies DNWR, equation (2.3), at all times. Such a path, given that {pt} is exogenous,
9 “Labor demand” is the function h(wt/pt) implicitly defined in equation (2.2). Given the assumptions
imposed on F , labor demand is positive, but strictly falling in wt/pt. The elasticity of labor demand is the
elasticity of h(wt/pt) with respect to the the real wage wt/pt.
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implies a path for hours {ht} from the firm’s labor demand (2.2). This in turn implies a path
for consumption {ct} from market clearing (2.4), and thereby a certain (expected) life-time
utility for the household, U0, from (2.1).
It follows that an equation is missing, an equation that pins down a unique such path
{wt}. Clearly, the missing equation is a labor supply curve. The labor supply curve that
maximizes household utility can be obtained as follows10
Definition 1. [EFFICIENT ALLOCATION] The allocation that maximizes household utility
U0 is the solution to the following problem
W(wt−1) = max {atF (ht)− V (ht) + βEtW(wt)}
subject to (2.2) and (2.3), for given exogenous {at, pt}.
Technically, this is a constrained dynamic optimization problem as in Lorenzoni (2008)
and Bianchi (2011, 2016).
I solve this problem in the Appendix A, which contains all proofs and derivations. By
attaching a multiplier to equation (2.3), the solution is as follows
Proposition 1. [LABOR SUPPLY EFFICIENT ALLOCATION] The labor supply curve in
the efficient allocation is given by the following expression
wrt + γEtβ
(
εt+1
εt
ht+1
ht
wrt
wrt+1
pt
pt+1
)
ψt+1 = V
′(ht) + ψt, (2.5)
where ψt ≥ 0, and where εt > 0 denotes the (negative of the) elasticity of labor demand with
respect to the real wage wrt ≡ wt/pt at time t.
The labor supply curve (2.5), along with the labor demand curve (2.2), the complementary
slackness condition, ψt(wt − γwt−1) = 0, and the constraints ψt ≥ 0 and wt ≥ γwt−1, pin
down the efficient equilibrium in this labor market.
Wage restraint.—As is well known, if the wage rigidity binds (ψt > 0), households are
being “pushed off” their labor supply curve as hours worked fall below the level which they
would like to supply. Yet, labor supply curve (2.5) shows that, in the efficient allocation, the
converse holds as well: in periods when the wage rigidity is slack (ψt = 0), but binding in the
next period with a positive probability (ψt+1 > 0 in some states of the world), households
should work more in the current period, as this keeps wages low. In other words, the real
10 As mentioned earlier, throughout the paper, “efficient” refers to efficiency conditional on DNWR being in
place, and therefore reflects “second best”. This terminology is in line with New Keynesian analysis of
optimal policy. For instance, any New Keynesian account of optimal monetary policy is, in fact, optimality
conditional on the assumed price or wage (typically, Calvo-style) rigidity.
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wage must fall short of the household’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure.11 This may be interpreted as “wage restraint”. In a labor market diagram, it
corresponds to a shift of labor supply to the right.
The purpose of wage restraint is to reduce variability in hours, as well as to the raise the
average level of hours—the first excessively high, the second excessively low in the presence of
DNWR. Both increases welfare from equation (2.1): a higher average level of hours translates
into a higher average level of output available for consumption. In turn, a lower variability
of hours raises consumption even further, as well as reduces the dis-utility of labor supply.
This is because hours enter household utility via the two concave functions F and −V . It
should be stressed that these arguments are completely independent of the traditional motive
for consumption smoothing.12
There is no wage restraint if wages are not rigid (γ = 0), or if shocks are sufficiently
small for DNWR to be never binding in equilibrium (ψt = 0 at all times)—the conventional
condition for efficiency whereby the real wage equates the marginal rate of substitution.
Conversely, wage restraint is more pronounced as the labor market is more rigid and as shock
volatility is larger. The interaction between risk and nominal rigidity is key, as in Basu and
Bundick (2017) in the context of price rigidities.13 Moreover, wage restraint depends on the
cycle. First, it is stronger as the utility loss associated with a drop in hours, as measured by
multiplier ψt+1, is expected to be larger. A second effect arises through a stochastic discount
factor : β(εt+1/εt)(ht+1/ht)(w
r
t /w
r
t+1)(pt/pt+1) > 0.
The discount factor declines in (expected) price inflation. This is a classical “greasing the
wheels” effect: price inflation erodes the real wage, such that any rigidity on the nominal wage
is effectively dampened (Tobin, 1972). Furthermore, the stochastic discount factor depends
on the slope of labor demand in the current versus the next period. To see this, note that
εtht/w
r
t is just the slope of labor demand at time t. Hence, the discount factor (and therefore
the extent of wage restraint) increases in the slope of labor demand in the next period, but
falls in the slope of labor demand in the current period.
This channel is important, as it will be the main driver of my results in the open economy
model below. The intuition is as follows: if labor demand is steep in the next period (ht+1
11 The marginal dis-utility of labor supply V ′(ht) corresponds to the households’ marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure in this model, because utility is linear in consumption. Otherwise, the
corresponding condition would be wt/pt ≤ V ′(ht)/U ′(ct), where U ′(ct) is the marginal utility of consumption
(see the open economy model in Section 3 below, which has a curved consumption utility).
12 This can be seen by recognizing that consumption utility is linear, such that the elasticity of substitution
between consuming today and in the future is plus infinity.
13 The model from this section can be easily solved numerically, by using value function iteration on the
expression in Definition 1. Therefore, in the Appendix B, I present a numerical example. The numerical
example confirms that wage restraint depends on shock volatility : a rise in volatility per se implies more
pronounced wage restraint.
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moves strongly with changes in wrt+1), a large drop in hours ensues if the wage rigidity binds
in the next period. As a result, wage restraint today should become stronger. On the other
hand, if labor demand is steep in the current period, wage restraint itself is highly distortive.
This is because, by keeping wages low, working hours are far above their frictionless level in
the current period. Intuitively, a trade-off between “under-employment” in the next versus
“over-employment” in the current period arises, which the stochastic discount factor resolves
in the most efficient way.
The previous arguments imply that wage restraint moves with the elasticity of labor
demand over the cycle. For example, if the elasticity is large precisely when the rigidity binds
(which occurs in downturns, that is, if the elasticity is counter-cyclical), wage restraint must
become stronger. The opposite holds if the elasticity is pro-cyclical. In the one-sector model
studied here, a cyclicality of the labor demand elasticity does not naturally arise. For example,
if we specialize to the production function F (h) = hα, the elasticity is εt = 1/(1 − α)—a
constant. In contrast, in a multi-sector economy where labor flows between sectors, the share
of labor employed in each sector determines the (aggregate) labor demand elasticity. This
will be the case in my open economy model, to which I turn next.
3 The model
This section lays down the open economy model which will be studied in the rest of the paper.
I consider an open economy that is small enough to not affect variables in the rest of the world,
that has a fixed nominal exchange rate vis-a`-vis the rest of the world (a currency peg), and
that faces DNWR, following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016). Three key features distinguish
my analysis. First, the country produces both tradables and non-tradables, and labor may
flow freely across both sectors. Second, the labor market is imperfectly competitive, implying
that wage setting is forward-looking (Elsby, 2009). Third, wage inflation may be driven from
the supply side, following technology shocks in the tradable sector, but also from the demand
side, following preference shocks.14 In what follows I describe the economic environment
under “laissez-faire”. Echoing my analysis of Section 2, below in Section 4 I will contrast this
allocation to the allocation where wage dynamics are efficient.
14 Both channels have been emphasized to have played a role in determining real exchange rates before the
euro crisis. The analysis in Berka et al. (2017) is based on the technology shocks, supply narrative. In
contrast, Martin and Philippon (2017) provide an example of the demand narrative.
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3.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households, indexed i ∈ [0, 1]. Each household maximizes
its objective
U0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{ZtU(A(cTt (i), cNt (i)))− V (ht(i))}
subject to the period budget constraint
pTt c
T
t (i) + p
N
t c
N
t (i) + Etst,t+1dt+1(i) = wt(i)ht(i) + Φ
T
t + Φ
N
t + dt(i),
and subject to a no-Ponzi constraint.
Here, Zt is the demand shock and U = (c
1−κ)/(1 − κ) is consumption felicity with risk
aversion coefficient κ > 1. Consumption is an aggregate c = A(cT , cN ) = [ω(cT )
1−1/ζ
+ (1−
ω)(cN )
1−1/ζ
]1/(1−1/ζ) where “T” and “N” distinguish tradable and non-tradable consumption.
In turn, ω ∈ (0, 1) is a consumption share parameter, and ζ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between the two consumption types. Cross-border state contingent claims are denoted dt+1(i)
and have a discount factor st,t+1. Households receive a wage income wt(i)ht(i) and firm profits
from both sectors, ΦTt and Φ
N
t .
I assume that the law of one price holds for tradable goods, such that pTt = e¯p
T,∗
t , where
e¯ is the fixed nominal exchange rate and pT,∗t is the price of tradable goods in the rest of the
world. For ease of exposition, I normalize the level of the fixed exchange rate to unity, and I
also assume that the price of tradables in the rest of the world is constant and equal to unity.
As a result, also pTt = 1.
15
First order conditions with respect to state contingent claims link the marginal utility
of tradable consumption to its rest-of-the-world counterpart: ZtUcTt (i) = U
∗
cT,∗t
—the “Backus
Smith condition” (Backus and Smith, 1993).16 I assume the rest of the world is in steady
state throughout, hence I let U∗
cT,∗t
= U∗cT,∗ be a constant. Moreover, throughout the paper, I
am using the following parametric assumption
Assumption 1. The intertemporal consumption elasticity 1/κ and the intratemporal con-
sumption elasticity ζ, coincide: 1/κ = ζ.
This assumption, which is known as “Cole-Obstfeld condition” (Cole and Obstfeld, 1991),
is useful as it simplifies substantially my algebraic expressions. Most importantly, it allows me
15 Frictions in the tradable-goods sector such as consumption home bias, would allow for short-run departures
of the price of tradable consumption from unity (that is, changes in the terms of trade). However this would
not affect that, under a fixed nominal exchange rate, tradable goods’ prices in the long run are pinned down
by the nominal anchor country (Corsetti et al., 2013). Therefore, the mechanisms described in this paper
would continue to hold in this extended environment.
16 In the general case, also the (tradable-goods) real exchange rate would appear in this equation. However,
because of my normalizations above, pT,∗t e¯/p
T
t = 1.
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to derive this economy’s labor demand elasticity in closed form, which is useful for interpreting
wage restraint (see Section 4.2, equation (4.3)).17
As a result of Assumption 1 the Backus-Smith equation can be written as
Ztω(c
T
t )
−1/ζ = U∗cT,∗ . (3.1)
such that cTt moves one-by-one with the demand shifter Zt. Note that, in equation (3.1), I
have already omitted household index i by anticipating that, in equilibrium, all households
will behave identically.
First order conditions with respect to tradable and non-tradable consumption link their
marginal utilities to their relative price: UcNt /UcTt = p
N
t , where I have used that p
T
t = 1. This
can be written as
1− ω
ω
(
cNt
cTt
)−1/ζ
= pNt . (3.2)
Finally, labor supply is discussed below, as households are organized into labor unions which
take the labor supply decision on their behalf.
3.2 Firms
Firms hire labor, produce either tradable or non-tradable consumption goods, and maximize
profits. They are price takers in the goods market, but face imperfectly substitutable worker
types in the labor market. The worker types are bundled by using a CES-type technology,
with elasticity of substitution θ > 1. Hence aggregate labor is ht = (
∫ 1
0 ht(i)
(θ−1)/θdi)θ/(θ−1),
implying labor demand curves ht(i) = (wt(i)/wt)
−θht with corresponding wage index wt =
(
∫ 1
0 wt(i)
1−θdi)1/(1−θ). Aggregate labor splits into labor employed by firms operating in the
tradable and non-tradable sector
ht = h
T
t + h
N
t . (3.3)
Profit maximization by firms in the tradable sector, ΦTt = max{atF (hTt ) − wthTt }, where at
is the technology shock, implies a labor demand curve
atF
′(hTt ) = wt. (3.4)
Profits in the non-tradable sector are ΦNt = max{pNt F (hNt )− wthNt }, implying that
pNt F
′(hNt ) = wt. (3.5)
Both labor demand curves must always hold with equality, because an excess labor demand
can always be healed if wages are unrestricted in their ability to rise. Below I will specialize
17 I experimented numerically with relaxing Assumption 1, and found that the quantitative difference, under
plausible model parameters, is small. In the Appendix A, I present all model equilibrium conditions in the
case where Assumption 1 is relaxed.
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to the functional form F (h) = hαj , αj ∈ (0, 1), where I allow parameter αj to depend on the
sector in which labor is employed: j ∈ {T,N}.
3.3 Unions
To allow wage formation to be forward looking, I assume that the labor market is imperfectly
competitive. Moreover, I consider a rich specification of labor supply, as I allow households
to be organized into (an arbitrary number of) labor unions. In terms of formalism, I follow
a well-established literature, focusing on the effects of varying degrees of wage bargaining
centralization (Calmfors and Driffill (1988); see also Alesina and Perotti (1997), Guzzo and
Velasco (1999), Cukierman and Lippi (1999), and Gnocchi (2009)).
There is a total number of J ≥ 1 unions in the economy. All households are assumed to
be organized into one of those unions, and unions are of equal size. Hence union j ∈ {1, ..., J}
has its members in the interval I(j) ≡ J−1[j− 1, j]. Because households are symmetric, each
union j will choose the same wage wt(i) for all of its members i ∈ I(j). We therefore write
wt(j) for the members of union j. Note that, as union size shrinks to zero (J → ∞), this
formulation nests the case of monopolistic competition (Benigno and Ricci, 2011). Following
the above-cited literature, the number 1/J can be interpreted as the economy’s degree of
wage bargaining centralization.
The problem of the individual union j is summarized in the following Definition.
Definition 2. [UNION PROBLEM] The problem of individual union j ∈ {1, ..., J} is to solve
the following problem
W(wt−1(j)) = max {ZtUcTt (j)wt(j)ht(j)− V (ht(j)) + βEtW(wt(j))}
subject to the set of constraints
i) wt(j) ≥ γwt−1(j) (downward wage rigidity)
ii) ht(j) = (wt(j)/wt)
−θ(hTt + h
N
t ) (union-type labor demand)
iii) wt = (
∑
1/J wt(j)
1−θ)1/(1−θ) (aggregate wage)
iv) atF
′(hTt ) = wt, (labor demand tradable sector)
v) ((1− ω)/ω)(F (hNt )/cTt )−1/ζF ′(hNt ) = wt (labor demand non-tradable sector)
by respecting Backus-Smith condition ZtUcTt (j) = UcT,∗, for given wages {wt(−j)} and for the
given exogenous {Zt, at}.
The objective of each union is to maximize the (utility-weighted) wage bill of its members,
net of the dis-utility of working, and subject to wages being restricted in their ability to fall.
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This is hence where DNWR enters the model: it is assumed to arise at the household level,
then, in equilibrium, passes through to the aggregate level. Notice also that each union takes
the wages of the other unions as given (denoted wt(−j)), such that the equilibrium aggregate
wage can be understood as the outcome of a Bertrand game. This includes the wages set by
the other unions in future periods, which otherwise the individual union could manipulate by
changing the aggregate wage through its own wage setting decision.18
To understand the constraints in Definition (2), note that the unions have market power
over the wage of their members if the labor types are imperfectly substitutable (θ <∞). As a
result, the unions’ problem is dynamic, subject to downward wage rigidity (condition i), and
subject to union-type labor demand curves (condition ii). If unions are small (J →∞), this
completes the unions’ problem, because their effect on the aggregate wage and hence on the
economy more generally is negligible. However, if unions have positive mass (J < ∞), they
understand their contribution to the aggregate wage (condition iii).19 The aggregate wage
wt matters for the unions, because an increase in wt reduces the demand for aggregate labor
ht = h
T
t + h
N
t via conditions iv)-v) and thereby, indirectly, the demand for union-type labor
ht(j), via ht appearing in condition ii).
Specifically, as the aggregate wage wt rises, the firms in the tradable sector hire less hours
as their marginal product of labor atF
′(hTt ) must rise (condition iv). The same occurs in the
non-tradable sector (condition v), yet, hours fall by strictly less due to a rise in the relative
price between tradable and non-tradable consumption pNt , equation (3.2).
20 This follows from
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. As wages rise, the relative price pNt must increase. As a result,
the sales price of non-tradables rises faster than the sales price of tradables (in fact, the sales
price of tradables does not rise at all due to our earlier assumptions). By implication, hours
fall by less in the non-tradable sector than in the tradable sector following a wage rise. This
channel will be taken up again in my analysis below.
In equilibrium, all unions behave identically such that index j disappears and only aggre-
gates matter. The following characterizes aggregate labor supply.
Proposition 2. [LABOR SUPPLY] Assume that each individual union behaves as detailed
18 Hence for tractability, I abstract from dynamic strategic interaction (e.g. Maskin and Tirole, 2001). Without
this assumption, the labor supply curve (3.6) can not be derived in closed form. Also, the numerical solution
procedure would complicate significantly, because finding the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the Bertrand
game would involve solving a fixed point problem. Note that in the case of either very large or very small
unions, the solution under dynamic strategic interaction coincides with the equilibrium studied here.
19 The integral wt = (
∫ 1
0
wt(i)
1−θdi)1/(1−θ) can be written as wt = (
∑
j∈{1,...,J} 1/J wt(j)
1−θ)1/(1−θ) once we
recognize that wt(i) = wt(j) for all i ∈ I(j), as argued above.
20 Here it is used that cNt = F (h
N
t ) in equilibrium, that is, all non-tradable output must be consumed within
the same period. See Section 3.4 below, the summary of equilibrium conditions.
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in Definition 2. In this case, the aggregate labor supply curve is given by
ZtUcTt wt
(
ε˜t − 1
ε˜t
)
+ γEtβ
(
ε˜t+1
ε˜t
ht+1
ht
wt
wt+1
)
ψt+1 = V
′(hTt + h
N
t ) + ψt (3.6)
where ψt ≥ 0, and where ε˜t > 0 denotes the (negative of the) union-specific elasticity of labor
demand with respect to the wage wt, written out in equation (4.2) below.
21
3.4 Equilibrium definition
For given exogenous {Zt, at} and an initial condition w−1 > 0, an equilibrium is a sequence
for endogenous variables {cTt , cNt , hTt , hNt , ht, wt, pNt , ψt} such that equations (3.1)-(3.6), along
with the definition for ε˜t given in equation (4.2) below, market clearing F (h
N
t ) = c
N
t , the
complementary slackness condition ψt(wt − γwt−1), and the constraints ψt ≥ 0 and wt ≥
γwt−1, are all satisfied.
4 Efficiency
I now turn to the main theoretical results of my analysis. First, I show that, while wage
restraint is an integral part of the equilibrium under laissez-faire, this equilibrium is generally
not efficient. Second, I show that this implies that wages may rise too strongly, but also by
too little, in boom periods under laissez-faire.
4.1 The efficient benchmark
I define the efficient benchmark for the open economy model introduced in the last section,
echoing Section 2. This benchmark allows me to assess the inefficiencies which characterize
the private allocation. Specifically, the efficient benchmark distills the optimal dynamics for
wages, while leaving all other behavioral and technological constraints in the private sector
unchanged. For example, the efficient allocation takes as given the consumption/saving choice
of the private sector, as captured by condition (3.1).22
To derive the efficient allocation, note that, first, the planner chooses the same individual
wage for all the unions, wt(j) = wt∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}. This is because the unions are symmetric
and the bundling technology is of the CES type. This also implies that ht(j) = ht∀j ∈
21 The attentive reader may notice that in Section 2, the elasticity εt was expressed with respect to the real
wage wt/pt, while in the present context, it appears to be expressed with respect to the nominal wage wt.
This is, however, not correct. In the current environment the numeraire is tradable consumption, the price
of which was normalized to one. Hence, the elasticity is expressed with respect to wt/p
T
t , which by setting
pTt = 1 coincides with the nominal wage wt.
22 This is in contrast to Bianchi (2011), Benigno et al. (2013) and others, who, in their analyses of optimal
capital controls, study the efficiency of the consumption/saving behavior of the private sector. In contrast,
in my analysis I study the efficiency of the wage setting behavior of the private sector.
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{1, ..., J}, that is, the planner also allocates the same amount of union-type labor. Next, the
social planner solves the following problem
Definition 3. [EFFICIENT ALLOCATION] The allocation that maximizes household utility
U0 is the solution to the following problem
W(wt−1) = max {ZtU(A(cTt , cNt ))− V (ht) + βEtW(wt)}
subject to equations (3.1)-(3.5), market clearing cNt = F (h
N
t ), and downward nominal wage
rigidity wt ≥ γwt−1, for given exogenous {Zt, at}.
While the unions in their maximization problem also respect private-sector equilibrium
conditions (in particular, the Backus-Smith condition (3.1) as well as the labor demand curves,
recall Definition 2 above), the key difference between the unions and the planner is that
the former maximize the utility-weighted wage bill, whereas the latter directly maximizes
household utility. I obtain the following condition for efficient labor supply
Proposition 3. [LABOR SUPPLY EFFICIENT ALLOCATION] The labor supply curve in
the efficient allocation is given by the following expression
ZtUcTt wt
(
εNt
εt
hNt
hTt + h
N
t
)
+ γEtβ
(
εt+1
εt
ht+1
ht
wt
wt+1
)
ψt+1 = V
′(hTt + h
N
t ) + ψt (4.1)
where ψt ≥ 0, and where εt > 0 (εNt > 0) denotes the (negative of the) labor demand
elasticity (in the non-tradable sector) with respect to the wage wt, written out in the main
text in equation (4.3) below.
The equilibrium definition in the efficient allocation is identical as in Section 3.4, except
that labor supply curve (3.6) has to be replaced by labor supply curve (4.1).
4.2 Wage restraint
Start with the observation that the equilibrium under laissez-faire is characterized by wage
restraint: a wedge term appears in labor supply curve (3.6), determined by the utility loss
expected to be suffered from DNWR in the next period. Therefore, in line with Elsby (2009),
the unions restrain wage increases in booms to reduce the potential for unemployment in
recessions. However, by inspecting labor supply in the efficient allocation (4.1), we also note
that wage restraint under laissez-faire is inefficient.
The difference arises from different stochastic discount factors entering the expected utility
loss. Plainly, the unions therefore assess the risk associated with the wage rigidity differently
than the social planner. More precisely, different labor demand elasticities enter the stochastic
discount factors: ε˜t 6= εt in general.
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Recall the role of the elasticity of (aggregate) labor demand εt in shaping wage restraint in
the efficient allocation, the discussion in Section 2. Instead, ε˜t corresponds to the elasticity of
the labor demand curve that is faced by the individual union. To understand this difference,
it helps to write out the elasticity ε˜t as
ε˜t =
(
1− 1
J
)
θ +
1
J
εt. (4.2)
It therefore corresponds to a weighted average between the elasticity of substitution between
the different labor types θ, and the elasticity of aggregate labor demand, εt, with the weight
determined by the size of the unions 1/J . Intuitively, as union grow small, 1/J → 0, ε˜t → θ,
reflecting monopolistic competition in the labor market. In contrast, as unions grow large
1/J → 1, ε˜t → εt, reflecting monopolistic labor supply.
The mechanism underlying this inefficiency is not new. It corresponds to an externality
due to strategic complementarity (e.g., Woodford, 2003), here due to strategic complemen-
tarity in wages. The wages set by the unions are strategic complements, because by lowering
the wage of its members thereby lowering the wage index, the individual union creates an in-
centive for the other unions to also lower the wage of their members—because their members
have now become relatively more expensive. This effect is not internalized by the individual
union. In contrast, were the unions to coordinate on this complementarity, their collective
wage choice would be the same as under the efficient allocation.23
To characterize this inefficiency further, we compute explicitly the (aggregate) labor de-
mand elasticity εt as follows
εt =
(
1− h
N
t
hTt + h
N
t
)
εTt +
hNt
hTt + h
N
t
εNt (4.3)
where εTt = 1/(1−αT ) is the labor demand elasticity in the tradable, εNt = 1/(1−αN +αN/ζ)
in the non-tradable sector. Hence, the aggregate labor demand elasticity is a weighted average
between the elasticity of labor demand in the two sectors, where the weight is determined by
the share of labor that is employed in the respective sector.24
It follows that εt is time-varying, to the extent that shocks shift labor across the two sectors
over the business cycle. Moreover, it follows that the individual labor demand elasticity ε˜t
reflects this cyclicality only to a limited extent, and not at all if unions are small (as in this
23 In less technical terms, the individual union perceives the effect on the aggregate wage of its compressing
a wage increase individually, to be small. It ignores that, by compressing a wage increase individually, it
creates an incentive for the other unions to also compress a wage increase. Therefore, in equilibrium, its
effect on the aggregate wage may in fact be large.
24 Notice that the labor demand elasticities in both sectors are constants, such that εt is time-varying only
because, following shocks, labor is being shifted across sectors. This is a consequence of Assumption 1.
Without this assumption, εNt would be time-varying, too—see the Appendix A.
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case ε˜t = θ, see above). It remains to be determined whether this implies that wage restraint
under laissez-faire is generally too weak, too strong, or whether this depends on the kind of
shocks which hit the economy.
To answer this question, first note that εT > εN unless the degree of substitutability
between tradables and non-tradables ζ is unreasonably large.25 In words, labor demand is
steeper in the tradable than in the non-tradable sector. The intuition was given in Section
3.3, however is repeated here for convenience. Following a wage increase, the relative price of
non-tradables vis-a`-vis tradables rises by virtue of the Balassa-Samuelson effect—the strength
of the relative price rise measured by ζ (the lower ζ, the more pronounced the relative price
effect). As a result, the real wage (the nominal wage wt divided by the goods’ sales price
in the respective sector) rises by more for firms in the tradable sector, leading them to curb
employment to a stronger extent.
Therefore, expansionary shocks that push labor into the tradable sector make εt pro-
cyclical. This happens for technology shocks at in this sector, as labor is drawn to this sector
which becomes relatively more productive. From the discussion in Section 2, we recall that a
pro-cyclical labor demand elasticity requires wage restraint to become weaker. Because the
labor demand elasticity ε˜t reflects this pro-cyclicality only to a limited extent, wage restraint
under laissez-faire, following these shocks, is too strong.
In sum, following technology (supply) shocks, wage restraint is too strong under laissez-
faire, implying that wage increases are excessively small. This qualifies results in Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2016), according to which DNWR in currency pegs implies that, necessarily,
wage increases are excessively large. Nonetheless, under demand shocks Zt, my results conform
with the findings in their paper: as demand shocks draw labor to the non-tradable sector,
wage increases under laissez-faire are excessively large.
4.3 Other sources of inefficiency
By comparing labor supply curves (3.6) and (4.1), we note two other differences (sources of
inefficiency) that are briefly discussed next. These inefficiencies are subordinate to my analysis
of wage restraint, because they would arise even if wages were not downward rigid. Precisely,
note that the (utility-adjusted) wage both under laissez-faire and in the efficient allocation is
multiplied by a mark-up,Mt ≡ (ε˜t−1)/ε˜t < 1 under laissez-faire,Met ≡ (εNt /εt)(hNt /ht) < 1
25 Empirically, elasticity ζ is found to be below unity, such that tradables and non-tradables are complementary
(see the cross-country estimates in Stockman and Tesar (1995); see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) and
Bianchi (2011) and the references therein). While the relative size of the elasticities εT and εN also depends
on the labor share parameters αT and αN in the two sectors, even assuming extreme values such as αT = 0.5
and αN = 1 would put an upper bound ζ = 2 above which the inequality ε
T > εN would no longer hold—
clearly above the empirically plausible range for this parameter.
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in the efficient allocation.26
The mark-upMt is well understood: it corresponds to a monopolistic wage mark-up as a
result of the unions’ exercising their market power. This distorts the equilibrium as wages are
pushed above the households’ marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
Through the elasticity ε˜t, the size of the mark-up depends on union size, which I discuss more
thoroughly in Section 5 below.
In contrast, byMet < 1, a wage mark-up also characterizes the efficient allocation. There-
fore, interestingly, (some) monopolistic mark-ups may actually make the laissez-faire equilib-
rium more efficient. The reason for this is as follows. The planner internalizes that, by virtue
of complete asset markets, labor can be reduced in the tradable sector without insofar reduc-
ing tradable consumption—the latter being pinned down in Backus-Smith condition (3.1). As
a result, the planner tolerates a wage somewhat above the households’ marginal rate of sub-
stitution, as this reduces working hours in the tradable sector thereby reducing the dis-utility
of work, while only by little reducing consumption (namely, only non-tradable consumption
falls).27 The unions do not internalize this effect as they maximize the households’ wage bill,
rather than the households’ utility from consumption.28
5 Decentralization
Wage dynamics under laissez-faire are inefficient. Before applying this insight to wage develop-
ments in euro area countries, in this section I briefly discuss (policy) options for decentralizing
the efficient allocation; discussing, in turn, capital controls, (time-varying) income subsidies,
and the industrial organization of the labor market.
5.1 Capital controls
One prominent way to address externalities in open economies is by using capital controls.
In fact, they are the prime tool for macro prudential policy in the context of credit frictions
(e.g. Benigno et al., 2013; Bianchi, 2011; Mendoza, 2002). Moreover, in Schmitt-Grohe´ and
26 The fact thatMet < 1 follows both from εNt < εt, recall the discussion in the previous subsection, and from
the fact that necessarily hNt < ht because of h
T
t > 0.
27 The well known terms-of-trade externality (Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001; De Paoli, 2009) relies on a similar
effect. By reducing hours, a small open economy can appreciate its real exchange rate, thereby maintaining
a high level of consumption via imports despite the drop in domestic production.
28 Notice that, in addition to their effect on the level for wages, the two terms Mt and Met , because they are
time-varying, also impact the cyclicality of wages. This is in addition to the effect on the cyclicality of wages
induced by wage restraint. As it turns out, taking this into account only re-enforces my conclusions. For
example, a technology shock, by increasing εt, movesMt closer to unity such that wage inflation is reduced
in the laissez-faire allocation. At the same time, this shock pushes Met farther below unity, such that wage
inflation is increased in the efficient allocation.
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Uribe (2016) capital controls are also shown to be effective in the context of DNWR, which
is not a credit but a nominal friction.
One benefit of my analysis is to explicitly describe the efficient allocation conditional on
DNWR. As a result, the source of inefficiency which stems from DNWR is directly revealed,
compare labor supply curves (3.6) and (4.1). This shows that, in my context, capital controls
cannot be used to decentralize the efficient allocation, even though both allocations have
different implications for the current account.29
For this reason, and because the benefits of capital controls are well understood, here I
abstract from an in-depth analysis of capital controls.30 Rather, in what follows I ask about
ways to address the inefficiency directly in the labor market.
5.2 Time-varying income subsidies
One way to achieve decentralization is by using time-varying subsidies. For example, imagine
that the households’ wage bill is subsidized by τt (paid for by lump-sum taxes). In this case,
the labor supply curve (3.6) needs to be replaced by
ZtUcTt wt(1 + τt)Mt + γEtβ
(
ε˜t+1
ε˜t
ht+1
ht
wt
wt+1
)
ψt+1 = V
′(hTt + h
N
t ) + ψt, (3.6’)
while all other equations remain unaffected by the policy intervention. It follows that, in a
period where the wage rigidity is slack (ψt = 0), a labor income subsidy
(1 + τt) =
1
Mt
([
ZtUcTt wt
]−1
(Wet −Wt) +Met
)
(5.4)
decentralizes the efficient allocation. For better readability, here I have written short for
wage restraint Wt ≡ γEtβ(ε˜t+1/εt)(ht+1/ht)(wt/wt+1)ψt+1 ≥ 0 in the decentralized, Wet ≡
γEtβ(εt+1/εt)(ht+1/ht)(wt/wt+1)ψt+1 ≥ 0 in the efficient allocation.
If the wage rigidity is not expected to be binding in the next period, the income subsidy
corrects for the monopolistic mark-up, net of the mark-up effect in the efficient allocation
(recall Section 4.3), such that (1 + τt) = Met/Mt. Instead, if wage restraint is stronger in
the efficient than in the decentralized allocation Wet − Wt > 0 (following demand shocks,
recall Section 4.2), the subsidy needs to be raised even further, as this raises the households’
29 By implementing optimal capital controls, the resulting allocation could only be “third best”, whereas
the efficient allocation described here is “second best”. Recall that “first best” is the allocation without
downward wage rigidity in the first place.
30 There is another, more applied, reason for which I do not analyze capital controls any further. In the context
of the euro area crisis, proposals to introduce capital controls in the euro zone have been consistently met
with the deepest skepticism, on the grounds that restricting the mobility of international capital would
undermine the single monetary system and therefore the unity of the euro zone. Even the case of temporary
capital controls has been fiercely debated, and is not clear to be compatible with EU law (see for example
the debate on capital controls in Cyprus, Markets Insight, 2013).
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after-tax income without a corresponding increase in the wage. Conversely, following supply
shocks the subsidy would need to be reduced.
The downside of using this scheme is that the income subsidy would need to be time vary-
ing. In particular, while the subsidy can be easily used to make the steady state efficient, the
whole idea of wage restraint is to curb variation over the cycle. It follows that implementing
wage restraint via such subsidies would require them to be equally varying with the cycle.
Therefore, even though such subsidies are a good policy tool in theory, in practice they may
be difficult to actually implement.31
5.3 The industrial organization of the labor market
As Section 4 has made clear, the inefficiency characterizing wage restraint is closely linked
with union size 1/J , or better, the degree of “bargaining centralization” (Calmfors and Driffill,
1988). Therefore, one way to decentralize the efficient allocation (or at least, to come close
to decentralization) may be to assess the industrial organization of the labor market.
In this respect, my analysis is closely linked with the literature that studies the benefits of
increased bargaining centralization, which traces back to Calmfors and Driffill (1988). This
literature argues that countries may benefit from having more centralized labor markets—
despite larger unions having more market power—because larger unions may better internalize
the effects of their actions and hence moderate their wage claims in the economy. Empirical
evidence for this mechanism is discussed in the related literature section.
In my analysis, these considerations gain new relevance in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium context of DNWR and wage restraint. I have shown earlier that ε˜t → εt as
1/J → 1, such that wage restraint becomes more efficient indeed as unions grow larger-sized.
Intuitively, this benefit arises because larger unions internalize the externality arising from
strategic complementarity.
From this does not follow, however, that more centralization (necessarily) raises household
welfare. Namely, against this stands a negative effect which stems from larger-sized unions
charging larger monopolistic mark-ups. This channel is well understood. As highlighted in
Guzzo and Velasco (1999), the effective elasticity between labor types decreases as the number
of unions falls due to reduced labor market competition, prompting the unions to exercise
their market power to a greater extent. In the open economy context discussed here, the
mark-up channel is particularly powerful, because the aggregate labor demand elasticity εt
31 Another issue is the following: if time-varying subsidies are available, they could be used to eliminate DNWR
outright. Indeed, while this would require an even higher degree of cyclicality, by subsidizing labor heavily
in recessions, the effects of downward wage rigidity can be eliminated entirely (see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2016), but also the fiscal devaluations literature more generally: Farhi et al. (2014)).
19
is particularly small. To see this, recall that εt is determined in equation (4.3). If the share
of employment in the tradable sector is 25 percent, if the labor share αj in both sectors is
two thirds, and if the elasticity between tradables and non-tradables is ζ = 0.7 (see Section
6 below for a discussion of these parameters), then equation (4.3) reveals that ε ≈ 1.23. It
follows that (ε˜ − 1)/ε˜ ≈ 0.187 as union size 1/J approaches one. But this corresponds to
a wage mark-up of more than 400 percent. Clearly, a monopolistic distortion of this size
dominates any dynamic gains from more efficient wage restraint.
My analysis thus suggests that very high degrees of centralization are likely to be detri-
mental for welfare, whereas an intermediate degree (or a very low degree, if the mark-up effect
always dominates the wage-restraint effect) may be best for welfare. This is in contrast to the
original finding in Calmfors and Driffill (1988), who have argued that very large unions can be
best for welfare. However, it is in line with later contributions in this literature, highlighting
that an intermediate degree of centralization may be welfare optimal (e.g., Guzzo and Velasco,
1999). In the Appendix B, I verify this result numerically. I show that this model produces
a U-shaped wage centralization curve, such that an intermediate degree of centralization is
best for welfare. However, recall that even with this best possible degree of centralization,
this allocation remains strictly inferior to the efficient benchmark.
6 Quantitative results
I now use the model to assess the efficiency of wage developments of euro area countries before
the euro crisis. For the empirical part, I use country-level data on tradable-sector TFP and
real exchange rates from 1995-2007, assembled in Berka et al. (2017).
6.1 Numerical algorithm, parameters, and policy functions
I first discuss the model’s numerical solution algorithm and its accuracy, and how I fix some of
the model’s parameters. I also show policy functions for endogenous variables against the two
shocks to provide intuition on shock identification, as well as to corroborate the theoretical
discussion from Section 4.
Solution algorithm.—The model features an occasionally binding constraint, making nu-
merical analysis challenging. Moreover, unlike in most models of occasionally binding con-
straints, the multiplier associated with the constraint appears explicitly in a conditional
expectation—see equations (3.6) and (4.1). As a result, conventional methods of dealing
with occasionally binding constraints, such as Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), fail in this en-
vironment. Instead, I develop a fixed point iteration (FPI) algorithm which solves the model
fully non-linearly. The algorithm relies on iteration directly over the conditional expectations.
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More details on the algorithm are in the Appendix C.
To assess the accuracy of the FPI algorithm, I solve the efficient allocation by using a
standard value function iteration (VFI) approach, based on an extensive grid such that the
outcome can be considered very precise. The value function approach is feasible, because
the efficient allocation has a recursive representation (recall Definition 3). I then compare
the resulting policy functions to those obtained from using FPI. The result is shown in the
Appendix B—the policy functions are close to identical. This is reassuring regarding the accu-
racy of the solution of the equilibrium under laissez-faire, for which a recursive representation
(and hence a VFI approach) is not available.
Parameters.—Below I will apply the model to a set of euro area countries. In this analysis,
I will use the same behavioral and technology parameters for each country, while allowing
these countries to face a different stochastic structure. I am making this assumption because
most of the model’s parameters are standard, do not differ much across countries, and can
be easily deduced from other studies. The same strategy is pursued in Berka et al. (2017) in
their DSGE model which they calibrate to countries in the euro zone.32
The data I employ is annual, hence I set β = 0.96 for the time-discount factor. I specialize
to the conventional functional form V (h) = h1+ϕ/(1 + ϕ) for the dis-utility of labor supply,
and I set the standard value ϕ = 2 for the (inverse) Frisch elasticity. This value is also used
in Eggertsson et al. (2014) in their open economy business cycle model which they calibrate
to the euro zone. I set the marginal utility of tradable consumption abroad U∗cT,∗ = 0.82
such that, in steady state, the current-account-to-GDP ratio is zero, 1 − cTss/yTss = 0. This
implies that ω measures the share of tradable in total consumption in steady state. I thus
set ω = 0.25, as well as the intratemporal consumption elasticity ζ = 0.7 such that the
consumption types are complements, both in line with the calibration for euro zone countries
in Berka et al. (2017). Note that ζ = 0.7 implies a risk aversion parameter κ = 1/0.7 ≈ 1.43
from Assumption 1. It is thus within the ballpark of risk aversion parameters used in open
economy business cycle models (Bianchi (2011) uses a value of 2). I follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2016) and set the labor share in the tradable and the non-tradable sector αT = 0.5
versus αN = 0.75, such that the labor share in the latter is slightly higher. Concerning
DNWR, I set γ = 0.96 such that wages can fall by at most one percent per quarter, again
following estimates in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) for euro zone countries. I set θ = 5
for the elasticity between labor types, in line with the calibration to the euro zone in Gal´ı
(2011) and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2016). I also set J =∞, such that the unions operate under
monopolistic competition. This is a relevant benchmark, as this case has been explored in
32 At the same time, this eliminates a degree of freedom by which different parameter choices across countries
could be used to explain their different wage experiences.
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β γ ζ κ ω ϕ U∗
cT,∗ αT αN θ J
0.96 0.96 0.7 1/0.7 0.25 2 0.82 0.5 0.75 5 ∞
Table 1: Parameters. Details on the shock processes are provided in the text.
earlier studies (see for example Benigno and Ricci (2011)). Furthermore, a more appropriate
value for 1/J is hard to determine, because the degree of bargaining centralization lacks a
direct empirical counterpart.33 Larger values for bargaining centralization 1/J are discussed
in the Appendix B. The parameters used are summarized in Table 1.
Policy functions.—I model the two shocks Zt and at as a first-order bivariate autoregressive
process in logs, as in Bianchi (2011)
log([at, Zt]
′) = ρ× log([at−1, Zt−1]′) + ut, (6.1)
where ut ∼ N ([0, 0]′,Σ), with ρ and Σ conformable matrices. Both ρ and Σ will be esti-
mated on a by-country basis below. To illustrate the effects of the shocks on endogenous
variables, and to corroborate the discussion from Section 4, here I assume that both shocks
are independent with an autocorrelation of 0.95, and have innovations with variance 0.001.34
Figure 1 shows the policy functions for the real exchange rate, a CPI-based measure in the
left panels, and since I focus on wage dynamics, a unit-labor-cost-based measure in the right
panels. I plot both against the technology (supply) shock at in the upper two panels, the
demand shock Zt in the lower two panels.
Both figures distinguish the equilibrium under laissez-faire (dashed-dotted in black) and
the efficient allocation (solid in blue). They also highlight the region where DNWR binds
under laissez-faire (the shaded area in gray). As expected, a positive shock to either demand
or to technology in the tradable sector appreciates (for both measures) the real exchange rate.
This is because both shocks increase the domestic nominal wages (not shown). Interestingly,
both shocks have quite different implications when negative: whereas the real exchange rate
(ULC-based) depreciates following negative demand shocks, it actually appreciates following
33 For example, trade union density by country as provided by the OECD is a related concept, however does
not strictly map into 1/J . Trade union density measures the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade
union members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners.
34 Hence the shock process used in Figure 1 is
ρ =
(
0.95 0
0 0.95
)
, Σ =
(
0.001 0
0 0.001
)
.
To implement this process numerically, I use the discretization routine developed in Gospodinov and Lkhag-
vasuren (2014), who extend the method of Rouwenhorst (1995) to vector auto regressions. Their method
is superior to the more common Tauchen-algorithm, if the shock process has a very high persistence. This
happens to be the case in my empirical analysis, where for some countries the shocks are estimated to be
close to unit root. More details on the numerical implementation are in the Appendix C.
22
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Supply
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
R
ER
 (C
PI
-b
as
ed
)
Constraint binding
Efficient
Laissez-faire
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Supply
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
R
ER
 (U
LC
-b
as
ed
)
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Demand
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
R
ER
 (C
PI
-b
as
ed
)
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
Demand
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
R
ER
 (U
LC
-b
as
ed
)
Figure 1: Policy function for the real exchange rate (RER). The CPI-based measure is defined
as cpit/cpiss, where the consumer price index is cpit ≡ (ω+(1−ω)(pNt )1−ζ)1/(1−ζ). The ULC-
based measure is (wtht/rgdpt)/(wsshss/rgdpss), where real GDP is rgdpt ≡ (yTt +pNt yNt )/cpit.
The subscript “ss” indicates the steady state of a variable. The respective other shock and
the endogenous state variable wt−1 are set to their steady state values.
negative technology shocks when DNWR is binding. This is because in this case, real GDP
declines, but not so the domestic nominal wages.
The most noteworthy result arises, however, once we compare the responses under laissez-
faire and the efficient allocation. Along the lines of the discussion in Section 4, the slope of
the real exchange rate is too small under laissez-faire following technology (supply) shocks,
but indeed too large following demand shocks.
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6.2 Euro area wage dynamics
In their paper, Berka et al. (2017) collect tradable-sector TFP and real exchange rate data
for euro area countries from 1995-2007. As explained there, these data can be interpreted
in the time series, but also in the cross section. This is because all variables are expressed
relative to an EU15 average. As a result, these data are already de-trended and therefore can
be used directly in my analysis.
In my analysis, I use these data to assess the efficiency of wage dynamics of euro countries
in the 1995-2007 period.35 The countries are Belgium (BE), Germany (GER), Spain (SPA),
France (FRA), Ireland (IRE), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NET), Austria (AUS), and Finland
(FIN). I follow a two-step procedure. First, for each euro country, for the given tradable-sector
TFP data {at}, and for the given set of fixed parameters discussed above, I estimate the series
of demand shocks {Zt} so as to match the observed data series {rert}, where rert denotes
the (CPI-based) domestic real exchange rate (as in Figure 1 above). Second, I simulate the
efficient allocation on {at, Zt} to obtain counter factual efficient estimates of the respective
euro area country’s real exchange rate.
To obtain the series {Zt} from the series of observables {rert, at}, in the general case one
has to use a non-linear filter. This is because of unobserved states, here the lagged level for
wages wt−1, which matter for the evolution of endogenous variables. I sidestep this issue by
making the following assumption. I assume that, in the initial period of the sample, the wage
rigidity has not been binding in any country. Economically, I am therefore assuming that
initially, none of the countries has experienced (severe) downward pressure on nominal wages
vis-a`-vis the newly-created nominal anchor. This assumption appears justified, given that at
the inception of the euro, exchange rates have been set to minimize the countries’ distance to
purchasing power parity (e.g., Berka et al., 2017).36
By denoting the solution for the real exchange rate rer(wt−1, at, Zt), this implies that
rer(a0, Z0) is not a function of w−1—because under occasionally binding constraints, the
lagged level for wt−1 matters only in periods where the constraint is binding. Next, because
a0 is observed, this function can be inverted from rer0 into Z0, because of the monotonicity
of the real exchange rate in demand shocks (see Figure 1). Finally, I use the policy function
for nominal wages w(a0, Z0) to obtain the lagged level for wages w0 in the first period, and
so forth in the next periods, such that in the rest of the sample the unobserved state wt−1 is
35 Extending the sample to the crisis period (beyond 2007) is not feasible, because the tradable-sector TFP
data is (currently) not available beyond 2007. Including more euro countries, such as Greece or Portugal, is
not feasible because the tradable-sector TFP data is not available for those countries.
36 While the euro has been incepted not before 1999, these countries have been part of the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) in between 1995-1999. While not exactly fixed, intra-euro nominal exchange rate
movements during this period have been small (Berka et al., 2017).
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ρ Σ
ρ11 ρ12 ρ21 ρ22 σ
2
11 σ
2
12 σ
2
21 σ
2
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BE 0.8853 -0.4106 0.0450 0.4175 0.00023 0.00002 0.00002 0.00139
GER 0.6829 -0.7754 0.0065 0.7355 0.00028 -0.00035 -0.00035 0.00173
SPA 1.0020 -0.0912 0.0526 0.9703 0.00039 -0.00026 -0.00026 0.00227
FRA 0.6678 0.0785 -0.0089 0.7111 0.00041 0.00004 0.00004 0.00121
IRE 1.0084 0.2860 -0.0515 0.7775 0.00219 0.00017 0.00017 0.00557
ITA - - - - - - - -
NET 0.9527 -0.6293 0.0020 0.3600 0.00048 -0.00026 -0.00026 0.00125
AUS 0.7110 0.4548 -0.1413 0.9946 0.00026 0.00013 0.00013 0.00112
FIN - - - - - - - -
Table 2: Estimated shock processes for euro area countries. No estimates are available for
Italy and Finland, see Figure 2 and the explanations in the text.
in fact no longer unobserved.
By using this procedure, I define a mapping from the solution of the model into a sequence
of shocks {at, Zt}. Furthermore, because of the assumed autoregressive structure of the shocks
described earlier, I can use standard econometric methods to obtain the two matrices ρ and
Σ characterizing the shock processes. However, there is one last complication. Because the
model is highly non-linear and wage setting is forward looking, the solution of the model itself
depends on the underlying structure of the shocks ρ and Σ. If we denote the solution of the
model Ω, we therefore end up with a fixed point problem
Ω : (ρ,Σ) 7→ (ρ,Σ). (6.2)
This fixed point has to be obtained numerically. Further details on how I obtain this fixed
point are provided in the Appendix C.
Shock series.—The estimated shock series {at, Zt} are shown in Figure 2, and summarized
in Table 2. Recall that the supply shocks (blue solid) correspond to tradable-sector TFP data,
whereas the demand shocks (dashed-dotted in black) are estimated to match the respective
country’s real exchange rate. It turns out that no estimates for {Zt} can be obtained for Italy
and Finland, because the process {at} for these countries is estimated to have an explosive
eigenvalue (this can be understood from inspecting {at} for these countries in Figure 2).37
37 Most likely, this is due to the sample being comparatively short. As mentioned above, the data is already
de-trended such that deviations of variables from their mean are expected to die out in a long enough sample.
25
96 98 00 02 04 06
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
B
E
a
Z
96 98 00 02 04 06
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
G
ER
96 98 00 02 04 06
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
SP
A
96 98 00 02 04 06
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
FR
A
96 98 00 02 04 06
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
IR
E
96 98 00 02 04 06
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
IT
A
96 98 00 02 04 06
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
N
ET
96 98 00 02 04 06
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
A
US
96 98 00 02 04 06
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
FI
N
Figure 2: Shock processes for euro area countries. Technology shocks {at} are used as model
input, demand shocks {Zt} are estimated. Years on the horizontal axis, from 1995-2007. The
shocks are expressed relative to an EU15 average (for example, a value of 1.2 indicates 20
percent above the EU15 average). No estimates for {Zt} are available for Italy and Finland,
as {at} for these countries is estimated to be explosive (see the figure).
26
Spain, in turn, is a knife-edge case as its shocks are very close to unit root. Overall, the
estimated shocks are large and persistent, and often times negatively correlated.
Efficient dynamics.—Turn now to the main result, the evolution of real exchange rates
of euro area countries in the efficient allocation. In Figure 3, black dashed lines correspond
to the real exchange rate data rert (used as model input), whereas blue solid lines are the
counter factual. I discuss each country in turn.
First, Belgium (BE) had a real exchange rate that was too weak throughout the entire
sample. This effect was particularly pronounced around the time where the euro was incepted,
and died out slightly before the start of the crisis. Recall that, in this model, the difference
between the efficient allocation and laissez-faire arises because of inefficient wage restraint.
Therefore, wage restraint was too strong in Belgium, reflecting the dominance of supply over
demand shocks throughout the sample, recall Figure 2.
For Germany (GER) a nuanced picture emerges. Initially, Germany had a very strong
real exchange rate relative to the rest of the euro area. In turn, the well-known fact that
German wages increased slower than in other euro countries before the crisis, is reflected by
the fact that its real exchange rate constantly depreciates until 2007—albeit starting from a
high level. The counter factual delivers two insights. First, the German real exchange rate
was too strong at the beginning of the sample. Second, there was too much wage restraint in
Germany until 2007 (which confirms conventional wisdom), reflected by the fact that the real
exchange rate in the efficient allocation depreciates more slowly than happened in actuality.
Yet, because of the initial level effect, the cumulative impact of too-strong wage restraint in
Germany until 2007, is comparably small.
The stark real appreciation in Spain (SPA) after 2002 is only partly detected as inefficient,
because the Spanish real exchange rate was too weak from the beginning of the sample until
about 2004, reflecting a relatively high tradable-sector technology (see Figure 2). However,
after 2004 the result flips, because the real appreciation is not matched by further technological
advances. As a result, in the efficient allocation the real exchange rate hardly appreciates after
2004. It follows that, in the years before the crisis, wage restraint in Spain should indeed have
been stronger.38 However, as a mirror image to Germany, the effect is weaker than expected
because of the Spanish real exchange rate having initially been too weak.
A similar pattern emerges for Ireland (IRE), whereas in the case of France (FRA) the real
exchange rate movements are found to be close-to efficient. Another clear case of too-strong
wage restraint is found in the Netherlands (NET): throughout the sample, the Dutch real
exchange rate is found to be too weak. Finally, the behavior of Austria (AUS) matches very
38 Unfortunately, the sample ends in 2007, such that it remains unclear whether this trend continues until the
height of the euro zone crisis.
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Figure 3: Real exchange rates (CPI-based)—data and counter factual. Real exchange rates
are in levels relative to an EU15 average. For example, a value of 1.2 indicates that the
country is 20 percent more expensive than the EU15 average. Years on the horizontal axis,
from 1995-2007. No estimates are available for Italy and Finland, see Figure 2.
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closely the experience of Germany.
In sum, I find evidence for the “perceived-wisdom hypothesis”—the fact that some euro
core countries have seen too little wage inflation before 2007, whereas some euro periphery
countries have seen too much of it—although the picture that emerges is more nuanced. For
example, the fact that the Spanish real exchange rate appreciated heavily is inefficient only
at the very end of the sample, whereas the fact that German wage moderation was inefficient
comes out less pronounced than is commonly thought.
6.3 Welfare effects
I conclude the empirical section by discussing welfare losses for the euro area countries. Note
first that, by the arguments made above, welfare losses under laissez-faire arise differently
depending on whether wage restraint is inefficiently strong or inefficiently weak. In the former
case, welfare losses arise during expansions, as wages and therefore consumption are too low
during these periods. In the latter case, instead, welfare losses arise during contractions, due to
the wage rigidity becoming binding too often (and too severely) which creates unemployment,
thereby generates an output loss and a loss in consumption.39
I report losses in terms of permanent consumption, which is the (negative of the) percent-
age increase in aggregate consumption in each period that is necessary for households to be
indifferent between staying under laissez-faire and moving to the efficient equilibrium. For-
mally, by denoting st ≡ (wt−1, at, Zt) the state of the economy, the per-period consumption
loss in percent λ%(st) ≥ 0 is defined by
Et
∞∑
j=0
βj{Zt+jU(At+j × (1 + λ%(st)/100))− V (ht+j)} !=W(st), (6.3)
where the value function W is welfare in the efficient equilibrium (Definition 3), and where
At+j and ht+j are (policy functions for) aggregate consumption and aggregate working hours
in the laissez-faire equilibrium at time t+j. In the Appendix A, I derive a formula to compute
λ%(st) conveniently. Through its dependence on the state of the economy st, the loss λ
%(st)
has a stationary distribution. I compute this stationary distribution numerically for each
country and report key statistics.
Table 3 shows the results. The first three columns are the 10-percentile, median, and
the 90-percentile, respectively, of the stationary distribution for the euro area countries un-
der consideration. The median loss is about 0.7 percent of permanent consumption for all
39 More precisely, unemployment itself does not generate the welfare loss, but the fact that if working hours
fall, the amount of production hence consumption must also be reduced. This implies that welfare losses
would be bigger if households suffered additionally from unemployment (rather than perceiving drops in ht
as additional leisure).
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λ%(st) λ
%(st)
“efficient - first best”
10% median 90% 10% median 90%
BE 0.4774 0.6922 0.9717 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
GER 0.2701 0.6926 1.4155 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003
SPA 0.0260 0.6955 3.3298 0.0001 0.0001 0.0016
FRA 0.5483 0.6922 0.8591 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
IRE 0.0207 0.6331 3.3705 0.0001 0.0002 0.0206
NET 0.3006 0.6923 1.3823 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
AUS 0.4603 0.6922 0.9903 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Table 3: Consumption loss per period, in percent, by country. The first three columns are the
10-percentile, median, 90-percentile of the stationary distribution of λ%(st), respectively. The
last three columns are the consumption loss between the efficient allocation and the allocation
under “first best”—that is, the efficient allocation under no wage rigidity: γ = 0.
countries. However, two countries stand out: Spain and Ireland. Given that their stochastic
structure has been estimated to be highly volatile and persistent (recall Table 2), both have a
90-percentile consumption loss of more than 3 percent. Therefore, even though the crisis has
not materialized in sample, the model identifies those countries with the more severe crisis
after 2008, as those countries with the highest chance of running into a severe loss in terms
of permanent consumption.
One last interesting statistic is the consumption loss between the efficient allocation and
the allocation under first best. Clearly, first best corresponds to the efficient allocation where
it is additionally imposed that γ = 0—wages are not downwardly rigid. This loss therefore
isolates the adverse effects of DNWR per se. The last three columns in Table 3 show the result.
Strikingly, I find that for all countries the consumption loss between the efficient allocation
and first best is very close to zero—it is slightly positive only for Spain and Ireland. This
verifies the main result in Elsby (2009) in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium analysis:
once wage setters are forward looking and wage restraint is efficient, the macroeconomic effects
of DNWR cannot be expected to be substantial.
7 Conclusion
A longstanding issue in macroeconomics has been the possible dis-employment effects of
downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). This issue has resurfaced with the recent euro
euro area crisis, where some countries, especially those in the periphery of the euro zone,
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have experienced a slow decline in their nominal wages despite large-scale unemployment.
This concern has been supported on the theoretical front, as Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016)
have shown that DNWR in currency pegs generates an externality by which wages rise too
quickly in expansions, exacerbating unemployment in contractions.
This paper adds to this debate by studying the implications of introducing forward-looking
wage formation into a Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016)-type model of DNWR. In this case,
I find that wage increases can be too large, but equally too small, in economic expansions.
Moreover I characterize that this depends on the kinds of shocks which hit the economy:
excessive wage inflation results from demand shocks, whereas excessive wage moderation
results from technology shocks in the tradable sector.
I use these insights to apply the model to euro area country data. This reflects a perceived
wisdom hypothesis: while euro periphery wage inflation is commonly perceived as too high
before 2007, euro core wage inflation is commonly perceived as too low before 2007—the
resulting imbalances exacerbating the subsequent euro zone crisis. I find some evidence for
the perceived wisdom hypothesis, yet quantitatively, it comes out less pronounced than is
commonly thought.
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A Appendix: Analytical derivations
The Appendix A contains analytical derivations, as well as the proofs of all propositions.
A.1 Assumption 1
Here I show the implications of Assumption 1 for Backus-Smith condition (3.1). In the general
case, this condition is ZtUcTt = U
∗
cT,∗t
, as written in the text. Hence, we need to evaluate the
derivative UcTt . From the utility function U(A(c
T , cN )), this is
UcTt = U
′((A(cTt , c
N
t )))AcT (c
T
t , c
N
t )
and with the functional forms imposed
UcTt = (A(c
T
t , c
N
t ))
−κ[ω(cTt )
1−1/ζ + (1− ω)(cNt )1−1/ζ ]1/(1−1/ζ)−1ω(cTt )−1/ζ
By recognizing that A(cT , cN ) = [ω(cT )1−1/ζ+(1−ω)(cN )1−1/ζ ]1/(1−1/ζ) the term [·]1/(1−1/ζ)−1
can be written as (A(cTt , c
N
t ))
1/ζ . Therefore the whole expression becomes
UcTt = (A(c
T
t , c
N
t ))
1/ζ−κω(cTt )
−1/ζ .
We see that under 1/κ = ζ the first term drops out such that we obtain
UcTt = ω(c
T
t )
−1/ζ
as claimed in the main text.
Notice that, without Assumption 1, tradable consumption cTt is endogenous, as it moves
with cNt = F (h
N
t ), and therefore with the wage. This matters in the proof of Proposition 3
below, and for the derivation of the labor demand elasticity in Section A.5 below.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The maximization problem is
W(wt−1) = max {atF (ht)− V (ht) + βEtW(wt)}
subject to the two constraints
i) wrt = atF
′(ht)
ii) wt ≥ γwt−1
where wrt ≡ wt/pt, for given exogenous {at, pt}.
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To solve this problem, attach multipliers λt to constraint i) and ψ˜t ≥ 0 to constraint ii).
Set up the Lagrangian
L = atF (ht)− V (ht) + βEtW(wt) + λt(wrt − atF ′(ht)) + ψ˜t(wt − γwt−1).
The first order conditions are
∂ht atF
′(ht)− V ′(ht)− λt(∂wrt /∂ht) = 0
∂wrt βEt
∂W(wt)
∂wrt
+ λt + ψ˜tpt = 0
and the Envelope condition is
∂W(wt−1)
∂(wrt−1)
= −γψ˜tpt−1.
Combine these equations and use condition i) to obtain
wrt +
∂wrt
∂ht
(ψ˜t − βγEtψ˜t+1)pt = V ′(ht).
Now define ψt ≡ −(∂wrt /∂ht)ψ˜tpt ≥ 0 to arrive at
wrt + γEtβ
∂ht+1/∂w
r
t+1
∂ht/∂wrt
pt
pt+1
ψt+1 − ψt = V ′(ht)
Multiply and divide by wrt /ht and define the labor demand elasticity εt ≡ −(∂ht/∂wrt ) ×
(wrt /ht) to rewrite this as
wrt + γEtβ
(
εt+1
εt
ht+1
ht
wrt
wrt+1
pt
pt+1
)
ψt+1 − ψt = V ′(ht),
which is equation (2.5) in the main text.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2, it will be convenient to first rewrite the union-type labor demand
curves such that wt(j) appears isolated on one side of the curve, not also indirectly through
aggregator wt. I do this in the following. Thereafter, I use the rearranged union type labor
demand curves to solve the union problem in Definition 2.
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A.3.1 Rewrite the labor demand curves
Rearrange the union-type labor demand curve as
J∑
j=1
1
J
wt(j)
1−θ = wt(j)1−θ
(
ht(j)
ht
) 1−θ
θ
⇔ wt(j)1−θ
(
1
J
−
(
ht(j)
ht
) 1−θ
θ
)
= −J − 1
J
∑
6=j
1
J − 1wt(i)
1−θ
⇔ wt(j) =
J − 1
J
((
ht(j)
ht
) 1−θ
θ
− 1
J
)−1 11−θ wt(−j)
such that
wt(j) =
(
J
J − 1
(
ht(j)
ht
) 1−θ
θ
− 1
J − 1
)− 1
1−θ
wt(−j)
where I define the wage index that includes all individual wages except for wt(j) as
wt(−j) ≡
 1
J − 1
∑
6=j
wt(i)
1−θ
1/(1−θ) .
Here
∑
6=j indicates summation over all indices i ∈ {1, ..., J} except for index j. Solving for
ht(j) yields
ht(j) =
(
J − 1
J
(
1
J − 1 +
(
wt(j)
wt(−j)
)−(1−θ))) θ1−θ
ht.
A.3.2 Solve the problem of the unions
With the rewritten labor demand curve, the problem in Definition 2 can be reformulated as
follows. Maximize
W(wt−1(j)) = max {ZtUcTt wt(j)ht(j)− V (ht(j)) + βEtW(wt(j))}
subject to the sequence of constraints
i) wt(j) ≥ γwt−1(j)
ii) ht(j) =
(
J − 1
J
(
1
J − 1 +
(
wt(j)
wt(−j)
)−(1−θ))) θ1−θ
ht(wt)
iii) wt =
 J∑
j=1
1
J
wt(j)
1−θ
 11−θ .
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In this expression, ht = h
T
t + h
N
t = ht(wt) depends on wt through the two labor demand
curves, as detailed in Definition 2. The Lagrangian for this problem is
L = ZtUcTt wt(j)
(
J − 1
J
(
1
J − 1 +
(
wt(j)
wt(−j)
)−(1−θ))) θ1−θ
ht(wt)
− V
(J − 1
J
(
1
J − 1 +
(
wt(j)
wt(−j)
)−(1−θ))) θ1−θ
ht(wt)

+ βEtW(wt(j)) + ψ˜t(j)(wt(j)− γwt−1(j)).
In a first step, we compute the partial derivative of ht(wt) with respect to wt(j) (recall that
wt depends on wt(j) for 1/J > 0)
∂
∂wt(j)
ht(wt(wt(j)) =
∂
∂wt(j)
wt × ∂
∂wt
ht(wt)
= − 1
J
(
wt(j)
wt
)−θ
× Ωt
where I have denoted Ωt ≡ −(∂ht/∂wt) the (negative of the) derivative of aggregate labor
demand ht with respect to the aggregate wage wt. In a second step, we compute the derivative
of the product wt(j)ht(j) with respect to wt(j), but by keeping aggregate hours ht constant
(recall that ht(j) is defined in condition ii) above; also, note that the product wt(j)ht(j)
appears in the Lagrangian). I obtain the following ∂
∂wt(j)
wt(j)
(
J − 1
J
(
1
J − 1 +
(
wt(j)
wt(−j)
)−(1−θ))) θ1−θht
=
[
(·) θ1−θ − θwt(j) (·)
θ
1−θ−1 J − 1
J
(
wt(j)
wt(−j)
)−(1−θ)−1 1
wt(−j)
]
ht
= ht(j)− θJ − 1
J
(
ht(j)
ht
) 2θ−1
θ
ht
(
J
J − 1
(
ht(j)
ht
) 1−θ
θ
− 1
J − 1
)
= ht(j)− θ
(
ht(j)− 1
J
(
ht(j)
ht
) 2θ−1
θ
ht
)
= ht(j)
(
1− θ
(
1− 1
J
(
ht(j)
ht
) θ−1
θ
))
,
where I use “(·)” as shorthand notation for the first (large) round bracket that appears in the
first line.
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In a third step, consider the derivative of the product wt(j)ht(j) with respect to wt(j) by
only considering the variation in ht(wt)
wt(j)
(
J − 1
J
(
1
J − 1 +
(
wt(j)
wt(−j)
)−(1−θ))) θ1−θ ∂
∂wt(j)
ht(wt)
= −wt(j)
(
J − 1
J
(
1
J − 1 +
(
wt(j)
wt(−j)
)−(1−θ))) θ1−θ 1
J
(
wt(j)
wt
)−θ
Ωt
= − 1
J
wt(j)
ht(j)
ht
(
wt(j)
wt
)−θ
Ωt,
where I have used the results on the impact of wt(j) on ht(wt) from above. Similarly, we
obtain the derivative of V (ht(j)) with respect to wt(j)
∂
∂wt(j)
V
(J − 1
J
(
1
J − 1 +
(
wt(j)
wt(−j)
)−(1−θ))) θ1−θ
ht(wt)

= V ′(ht(j))
(
−θ ht(j)
wt(j)
+ θ
1
J
(
ht(j)
ht
) 2θ−1
θ ht
wt(j)
− 1
J
ht(j)
ht
(
wt(j)
wt
)−θ
Ωt
)
= V ′(ht(j))
(
−θ ht(j)
wt(j)
(
1− 1
J
(
ht(j)
ht
) θ−1
θ
)
− 1
J
ht(j)
ht
(
wt(j)
wt
)−θ
Ωt
)
.
In a fourth step, consider the partial derivative
∂
∂wt(j)
βEtW(wt(j)) + ψ˜t(j)(wt(j)− γwt−1(j))
= βEt
∂
∂wt(j)
W(wt(j)) + ψ˜t(j),
which, once combined with the Envelope condition
∂
∂wt−1(j)
W(wt−1(j)) = −γψ˜t(j)
becomes
= ψ˜t(j)− βγEtψ˜t+1(j).
We have computed all derivatives which are necessary to take the first order condition of
the Lagrangian with respect to wt(j). By putting all pieces together and by using that, in
the symmetric equilibrium, wt(j) = wt, ht(j) = ht, and ψ˜t(j) = ψ˜t, I obtain
V ′(ht)
(
J − 1
J
θ +
1
J
Ωt
wt
ht
)
= ZtUcTt wt
(
J − 1
J
θ +
1
J
Ωt
wt
ht
− 1
)
− wt
ht
(ψ˜t − βγEtψ˜t+1)
Define now the elasticity
ε˜t ≡ J − 1
J
θ +
1
J
εt
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where εt ≡ Ωtwt/ht denotes the elasticity of aggregate labor demand, to write the labor
supply curve as
ZtUcTt wt
(
ε˜t − 1
ε˜t
)
− 1
ε˜t
wt
ht
(ψ˜t − βγEtψ˜t+1) = V ′(ht).
Lastly, define ψt ≡ (ψ˜twt)/(ε˜tht) ≥ 0 to rewrite this as
ZtUcTt wt
(
ε˜t − 1
ε˜t
)
+ γEtβ
(
ε˜t+1
ε˜t
ht+1
ht
wt
wt+1
)
ψt+1 − ψt = V ′(ht)
which is equation (3.6) in the main text.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The problem of the planner can be written as a Lagrangian
L = ZtU(A(cTt (hNt ), F (hNt )))− V (ht) + βEtW(wt) + λt(wt − wt(ht)) + ψ˜t(wt − γwt−1),
subject to Backus-Smith condition (3.1) (in the general case, making cTt a function of h
N
t , see
the discussion in Section A.1), and subject to equations (3.2)-(3.5). Note that cTt , h
N
t , h
N
t
and therefore ht = h
T
t + h
N
t all depend on the wage wt through the demand curves and the
Backus-Smith condition, which are constraints in the maximization. In the Lagrangian, the
fact that the wage depends on labor demand is captured in the constraint with multiplier λt.
The first order conditions are
∂hTt −V ′(ht)− λ1,t
∂wt
∂hTt
= 0
∂hNt Zt(UcTt
∂cTt
∂hNt
+ UcNt F
′(hNt ))− V ′(ht)− λ2,t
∂wt
∂hNt
= 0
∂wt βEt
∂W(wt)
∂wt
+ λ1,t + λ2,t + ψ˜t = 0
and the Envelope condition is
W(wt−1)
∂wt−1
= −γψ˜t.
Now use that pNt = UcNt /UcTt (equation (3.2)) as well as p
N
t F
′(hNt ) = wt (labor demand curve
(3.5)) to combine the previous equations as
ZtUcTt
(
∂cTt
∂hNt
+ wt
)
∂hNt
∂wt
− V ′(ht) ∂ht
∂wt
+ (ψ˜t − γβEtψ˜t+1) = 0,
where we have used that ht = h
T
t + h
N
t and hence that ∂ht/∂wt = ∂h
T
t /∂wt + ∂h
N
t /∂wt. If
we now define ψt ≡ ψ˜t/(−∂ht/∂wt) ≥ 0 we can rewrite this further as
ZtUcTt
(
∂cTt
∂hNt
+ wt
)(
εNt
εt
hNt
ht
)
+ γEtβ
(
εt+1
εt
ht+1
ht
wt
wt+1
)
ψt+1 − ψt = V ′(ht) (A.1)
where εt ≡ −(∂ht/∂wt)×(wt/ht) and εNt ≡ −(∂hNt /∂wt)×(wt/hNt ). If we impose Assumption
1, ∂cTt /∂h
N
t = 0, and this equation collapses to equation (4.1).
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A.5 Labor demand elasticity
Here I derive the labor demand elasticities εt, ε
N
t and ε
T
t , see equation (4.3) in Section 4.
Recall that the labor demand curves are
atαT (h
T
t )
αT−1 = wt (A.2)
αN
(1− ω)
ω
(hNt )
αN−1−αN/ζ
(cTt )
−1/ζ = wt, (A.3)
where the first equation is equation (3.4), the second is the combination of equations (3.5)
and (3.2). From this we may easily compute εTt
−∂h
T
t
∂wt
=
1
1− αT
hTt
wt
such that εTt ≡ −(∂hTt /∂wt)× (wt/hTt ) = 1/(1− αT ).
The slope ∂hNt /∂wt is more involved. This is because, in the general case, c
T
t depends on
hNt because of the Backus-Smith condition (3.1), see Section A.1. If we take the derivative
with respect to hNt on both sides of equation (A.3) we get
− ∂wt
∂hNt
= (1− αN + αN/ζ) wt
hNt
− 1
ζ
wt
cTt
∂cTt
∂hNt
.
Under Assumption 1, ∂cTt /∂h
N
t = 0 such that ε
N
t collapses to ε
N
t ≡ −(∂hNt /∂wt)×(wt/hNt ) =
1/(1− αN + αN/ζ), as claimed in the main text. The general case is discussed below.
To compute the aggregate labor demand elasticity, recall that ht = h
T
t + h
N
t , such that
∂ht/∂wt = ∂h
T
t /∂wt + ∂h
N
t /∂wt. From this follows that
εt ≡ ∂ht
∂wt
wt
ht
=
(
∂hTt
∂wt
+
∂hNt
∂wt
)
wt
hTt + h
N
t
=
∂hTt
∂wt
wt
hTt
hTt
hNt + h
T
t
+
∂hNt
∂wt
wt
hNt
hNt
hNt + h
T
t
=
(
1− h
N
t
hTt + h
N
t
)
εTt +
hNt
hTt + h
N
t
εNt ,
which is equation (4.3).
To compute ∂cTt /∂h
N
t in the general case without Assumption 1 (note that this derivative
also appears explicitly in equation (A.1)), we use the Backus-Smith equation (3.1) in the
general case, derived in Section A.1. Taking derivative with respect to hNT yields(
1
ζ
− κ
)
U∗cT,∗
A(cTt , F (h
N
t ))
(
AcT
∂cTt
∂hNt
+AcNF
′(hNt )
)
− 1
ζ
U∗cT,∗
cTt
∂cTt
∂hNt
= 0
⇔
(
1
ζ
− κ
)(
AcT
∂cTt
∂hNt
+AcNF
′(hNt )
)
− 1
ζ
A(cTt , F (h
N
t ))
cTt
∂cTt
∂hNt
= 0
⇔
(
1
ζ
− κ
)(
ω(cTt )
−1/ζ ∂cTt
∂hNt
+ (1− ω)(F (hNt ))−1/ζF ′(hNt )
)
− 1
ζ
A(cTt , F (h
N
t ))
1−1/ζ
cTt
∂cTt
∂hNt
= 0
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such that(
1
ζ
− κ
)
ζ(1− κ)
(
ω(cTt )
−1/ζ ∂cTt
∂hNt
+ (1− ω)αN (hNt )−αN/ζ+αN−1
)
− A
1−κ−1/ζ
cTt
∂cTt
∂hNt
= 0,
from which ∂cTt /∂h
N
t is implicitly defined.
A.6 Welfare
Here I show how to compute equation (6.3) conveniently, see Section 6.3. Denote Alf (st) the
policy function for aggregate consumption under laissez-faire in state st ≡ (wt−1, at, Zt), and
equivalently for hlf (st). The state under laissez-faire evolves as s
lf
t+1(st) = (w
lf (st), at+1, Zt+1),
where wlf (st) is the policy function for aggregate wages.
Define welfare implied by this allocation via
W lf (st) = ZtU(Alf (st))− V (hlf (st)) + βEtW lf (slft+1(st)).
In turn, welfare in the efficient allocation can be computed as
We(st) = ZtU(Ae(st))− V (he(st)) + βEtWe(set+1(st))
with the corresponding policies having superscript e. Note that, by definition of efficiency, it
must be the case that W lf (st) ≤ We(st) in all states st.
The permanent consumption equivalent is a function λ(st) multiplying consumption policy
Alf (st) such that W lf (st) =We(st) in all states st. We may therefore write
We(st) = ZtU(λ(st)Alf (st))− V (hlf (st)) + βEtWe(slft+1(st)),
where I have inserted function λ(st) and replaced value function W lf by We. Importantly,
the policy slft+1(st) from laissez-faire still appears in the argument of the expectation of the
value function on the right hand side. Hence, the state still evolves as under laissez-faire, and
only the utility derived from consumption is altered by function λ(st).
If we use that function U is of the CRRA type (and thus homothetic), this equation can
be further rewritten as
We(st) = λ(st)1−κZtU(clf (st))− V (hlf (st)) + βEtWe(slft+1(st)).
Rearranging and solving for λ(st) I obtain
λ(st) = {[We(st)− βEtWe(slft+1(st)) + V (hlf (st))]/(ZtU(clf (st)))}1/(1−κ),
which can be solved numerically. The gain in percent follows from λ(st) via
λ%(st) = (λ(st)− 1) ∗ 100%.
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B Appendix: Additional Figures
The Appendix B contains additional figures.
B.1 Neoclassical labor market with DNWR
Here I complement the insights in Section 2 by solving the model numerically. I assume the
model is quarterly frequency, hence I set β = 0.99 and γ = 0.99. I set gross price inflation
pt/pt−1 = 1. Hence I assume that pt is not stochastic. Zero net inflation is without loss of
generality, because in this model, higher trend inflation is isomorphic to a lower γ. The labor
share α is set to two thirds. As in the open economy model, the Frisch elasticity is set to
ϕ = 2. As for the technology shocks, I assume an autoregressive process as follows
log(at) = 0.95× log(at−1) + 0.02× ut.
The parameters used are summarized in Table 4.
Parameter Value assigned
β Time discount factor 0.99
pt/pt−1 Gross price inflation 1
γ Downward nominal wage rigidity 0.99
α Labor share 0.66
ϕ Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 2
Table 4: Parameters used for numerical example.
I solve the model using value function iteration, see Definition 1. The result is shown in
Figure 4. The left panel shows the policy function for the nominal wage against technology
shocks. I contrast the efficient allocation (blue solid) to an allocation where wrt = V
′(ht)
in periods when the wage rigidity is slack (dashed dotted in black), which I call “Perfect
competition”, because this would be the allocation under a perfectly competitive labor market
(see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016)).
The difference between the two allocations can be made more stark in the following way.
Define an “endogenous wage mark-down”Mt as wrt = (1 +Mt/100)V ′(ht). Then, the mark-
down is negative whenever there is wage restraint in the efficient allocation, but positive
whenever the wage rigidity binds, as wages rise above the marginal rate of substitution. In
the right panel of Figure 4, I plot Mt only in the region where it is negative.40
40 The kink in the mark-down policy is the point where the constraint starts to bind in the efficient allocation.
As wages cannot be lowered to the left of this point, the mark-down quickly shrinks to zero. “Constraint
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Figure 4: Policy function for nominal wages wt and the mark-down Mt in the technology
shock at. The other state variable wt−1 is kept at its steady state.
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Figure 5: Robustness against alternate values for shock volatility, σ. The blue lines denote
the efficient allocation. Details as in Figure 4.
As expected, wages rise in a “boom”, yet are restricted in their ability to fall in a “bust”.
Note that the mark-down becomes more negative, or equivalently, wage restraint becomes
stronger, as the boom is larger. This reflects that larger technology shocks generate stronger
wage-inflationary pressure, such that, in the following period, there is a higher chance that a
negative shock will make the wage rigidity bind. Therefore, more wage restraint in the boom
period is required.
Figure 5 shows how results change with a different shock volatility. We note that as
binding” is the region where also the allocation under wrt = V
′(ht) becomes constrained (which occurs at
slightly lower technology shocks than in the efficient allocation, see Figure 4 left panel).
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shock volatility is increased to σ = 0.025, the efficient wage mark-down reaches more than 10
percent when shocks are large. In contrast, the policy functions under perfect competition
are not affected by shock volatility. This verifies that, under DNWR, wage restraint operates
through economic uncertainty, as in the literature on time-varying risk (Basu and Bundick,
2017; Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2015).
B.2 Comparing FPI and VFI
As explained in Section 6.1, I develop a fixed point iteration (FPI) algorithm to solve the
model fully non-linearly. The algorithm is described in more detail in the Appendix C. To
assess the accuracy of the algorithm, here I compare policy functions obtained from FPI
and, alternatively, value function iteration (VFI) for the efficient allocation. This is feasible,
because the efficient allocation has a recursive representation (see Definition 3).
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Figure 6: Solving the efficient allocation using fixed point iteration (FPI, blue solid) versus
value function iteration (VFI, black dashed)—see the discussion in Section 6.1. Shown are
policy functions for the CPI-based real exchange rate cpit/cpiss, where cpit ≡ (ω + (1 −
ω)(pNt )
1−ζ)1/(1−ζ), against the supply shock at and the demand shock Zt, as in Figure 1.
The result is shown in Figure 6: policy functions are close to identical. The value function
iteration is based on an extensive grid for the endogenous state variable wt−1, composed of 500
grid points. Moreover, the shocks at and Zt are discretized using the method in Gospodinov
and Lkhagvasuren (2014), extending the method in Rouwenhorst (1995), by using 31 grid
points each. The convergence criterion is set at 1e− 7.
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B.3 The quantitative impact of 1/J
In my quantitative application in Section 6, I have used a value of 1/J = 0, such that
unions operate under monopolistic competition. To complement my findings there, and to
corroborate my discussion from Section 5, here I show an example of a wage bargaining
centralization curve in this model.
These curves have been popularized by Calmfors and Driffill (1988). They correspond to
average welfare (or average welfare loss) plotted against the degree of bargaining centralization
1/J . In my analysis, the relevant metric is the median permanent consumption equivalent,
given in equation (6.3).
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Figure 7: Bargaining centralization curve. Median permanent consumption loss in percent,
plotted against union size 1/J , for the case of Germany.
Figure 7 shows this curve at the example of Germany; qualitatively, results are similar
for the other countries. As it turns out, the median welfare loss is decreasing initially in
union size, whereas for 1/J large enough, the loss increases again. As explained in Section 5,
an intermediate degree of bargaining centralization is therefore optimal in this model, as for
example in Guzzo and Velasco (1999).
C Appendix: Numerical implementation
The Appendix C contains details on the numerical implementation of the model.
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C.1 Solving the equilibrium under laissez-faire
Here I provide details on the fixed point iteration (FPI) algorithm to solve the equilibrium
under laissez-faire. The relevant system of first order conditions is repeated for convenience
Ztω(c
T
t )
−1/ζ = U∗cT,∗ (C.1)
1− ω
ω
(
(hNt )
αN
cTt
)−1/ζ
= pNt (C.2)
atαT (h
T
t )
αT−1 = wt (C.3)
pNt αN (h
N
t )
αN−1 = wt (C.4)
(hTt + h
N
t )
ϕ + ψt = U
∗
cT,∗wt
(
ε˜t − 1
ε˜t
)
+ γEtβ
(
ε˜t+1
ε˜t
hTt+1 + h
N
t+1
hTt + h
N
t
wt
wt+1
)
ψt+1 (C.5)
ε˜t =
(
1− 1
J
)
θ +
1
J
εt (C.6)
εt =
(
1− h
N
t
hTt + h
N
t
)
1
1− αT +
hNt
hTt + h
N
t
1
1− αN + αN/ζ . (C.7)
along with the conditions ψt ≥ 0, wt ≥ γwt−1 and ψt(wt − γwt−1) = 0.
The iteration proceeds as follows. Construct a grid for the state st = (wt−1, at, Zt). Set
i = 0 (first iteration). Guess a function Λi(st) = γEtβ
(
ε˜t+1
ε˜t
hTt+1+h
N
t+1
hTt +h
N
t
wt
wt+1
)
ψt+1 (I guess a
matrix of zeros initially). Assume the constraint is slack everywhere ψ(st) = 0. Given that
cTt is exogenous from (C.1), at each grid point, equations (C.2)-(C.7) form a system of six
equations in six unknowns (hNt , p
N
t , h
T
t , wt, ε˜t, εt). Solve this system for wt at each grid point,
which results in a function w(st). Notice that for this step, a non-linear equation solver is
required given that the system cannot be solved for wt in closed form.
Check that w(st) ≥ w−(st), the latter the function for wt−1 that is flat in the shocks,
the identity function in wt−1. At the grid points where the check fails, update wt by setting
it to γwt−1. This results in a function w(st) where the wage rigidity is respected. Use this
function to obtain functions hT (st) from (C.3), thereafter h
N (st) and p
N (st) from (C.2) and
(C.4), ε(st) from (C.7), ε˜(st) from (C.6) and finally, ψ(st) from (C.5).
Set i = 1 (second iteration). By using these policy functions, update the guess for Λi(st).
Repeat until convergence of Λi(st). For the algorithm, I use 300 grid points for wt−1, and
31 grid points for each of the shocks. I discretize the shocks using the method described in
Gospodinov and Lkhagvasuren (2014).
C.2 Solving the fixed point in the estimation in Section 6.2
I obtain this fixed point by iteration. Given (ρ,Σ), I compute the model solution Ω(ρ,Σ).
I am using this model solution to obtain the shock series {at, Zt} as described in Section
47
6.2. I am using a vector auto regression toolbox in order to obtain an estimate (ρ′,Σ′)
from this process. Finally, I use these to obtain a new model solution Ω(ρ′,Σ′). If the
updating (dampening) parameter on ρ is sufficiently small, this iteration always converges
in my application. In contrast, no dampening parameter can be used for Σ, as a weighted
average of two covariance matrices need not again be a covariance matrix (that is, the resulting
matrix may not be positive definite).
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